

A Colloquium convened by
***THE VIOLENT STATES,
STATES OF VIOLENCE PROJECT***

States, citizens, subjects & violence

An African / Latin American engagement

2019
21-23 AUG



**Society, Work
& Politics Institute**
'the making and unmaking of social order'



VIOLENT STATES, STATES OF VIOLENCE

Violence remains one of the most vexing, recalcitrant and embedded features of our time - in South Africa, Africa and globally. Violence raises macro-questions about history, modernity, and the state, but also raises intimate questions that warp and scar multitudes of individual lives - regarding self, subjectivity, relationality, sex, safety, and home. Violence can be tacit, everyday, symbolic, background, concealed, or registered in fear and hatred rather than incident. It can be event, spectacle, systemic, a form of insurgent politics that calls attention to deeper social, political and economic challenges facing the nation-state - or simply call attention to itself. Despite violence having specific origins, trajectories, dynamics and meanings in different places, it travels across space, time and context - as evidenced in the wide ranging manifestations of structural, state-sanctioned, political, collective, interpersonal, gendered and other forms of violence that characterise so many global settings. South Africa is a site of particularly complex and interconnected forms of violence, and notwithstanding more than 20 years of democratic consolidation, offers a potentially rich site for theoretical and interdisciplinary innovation in relation to critical violence studies, which could have global resonances. It also offers opportunities to study continuities and disjunctures in historical and contemporary forms and expressions of violence, given the extended history of violence in the country, but is furthermore a site for comparative research as well.

The primary aims of this project are to consolidate and strengthen existing *interdisciplinary research and theorising* on violence; to develop *leading edge theory* on the relationship between structural and direct violence, subjective and objective violence, or systemic and interpersonal violence, with an emphasis on understanding and analysing *how* violence occurs in the service of understanding *why* violence occurs; to develop new cohorts of *critical violence scholars*; and to establish a collaborating and cutting edge national, continental and international *hub of innovative and critical violence research*.

To this end, the project is interested in the connections and dynamics between violence and large-scale structures and institutions, citizenship, subjectivity and the intimate productions of selfhood - captured here by its title, '**Violent States, States of Violence**'. The modern state produces, and is the site of, a vast range of violences - a state that is indeed a violent state, and is reciprocally implicated in multiple **states of violence** through which embodied, actional and agentic subjects and persons are interpellated into violent encounters. We are particularly interested in how violence reticulates along varied structural, social, political, communal, collective, interpersonal, cultural, embodied, moral, affective and emotional conduits in constituting a matrix - one in which there is an ongoing interplay between structural conditions that enable violence, and processes of subject and self formation in which violence comes to play a formative and reproductive function. Here, violent encounters represent sites of convergence for persons, social subjects, citizens and social structures, but also provide opportunities to understand the mechanics, processes, dynamics, and 'how' of violence that should offer deeper understandings of the 'why' of violence.



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A colloquium convened by the
'Violent States, States of Violence'
research project at the University of the Witwatersrand

Garth Stevens, Karl von Holdt & Javier Auyero





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Security, states and subjects

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This colloquium is designed to facilitate an engagement between scholars of violence in Latin America and in Africa with a view to developing new perspectives on politics, violence, citizenship and subjecthood, its causes, and the work it accomplishes.

The emergence of Western modernity was characterised by multiple violent processes - revolution, the formation of the nation-state, the historical consolidation of the means of violence in the state, the ascendancy of town over country, the disembedding of the modern individual from complex patrimonial, clan, generational, and local relations, and the formation of the modern 'docile' subject - but also matched by slow processes of internal population 'pacification' and 'civilisation'. Such processes of 'pacification' and 'civilisation' were reflected in the ideas within the social sciences that violence had become an aberration, an abnormality, or something that occurred elsewhere, outside the Western domain of modernity. Violence has ceased to be a central concern of disciplines such as history, sociology, political science or psychology, but is increasingly confined to sub-specialities such as criminology, deviancy studies, studies of gang or youth 'sub-cultures', penology, and war studies. Social theory, assuming that violence was no longer central to the formation and sustaining of social order, developed new theories of ideological control, consumerism, symbolic violence, or govern-mentality as ways of explaining domination and social order.

In much of the Global South things are different. The centrality of violence to colonialism, imperialism, and global and local forms of domination calls for a rethinking of social science assumptions.

For the purposes of this colloquium, we take as a starting point a focus on the relationship between states, citizens, subjecthood, politics and violence; and at the same time are convinced that the workings of politically-inflected forms of violence require that we rethink prevailing concepts of the state, democracy, citizenship and politics.

Democratic states may collude with embedded elites such as drug cartels or 'traditional' chiefs to sustain violent and authoritarian local regimes linked to lucrative financial flows derived from drug trading or mineral extraction. The state-party nexus itself becomes a site of violence in which different factions compete with each other to access resources and reconstitute patronage relations. The state may recapitulate colonial repertoires of violence in repressing popular expressions of grievance, such as the Marikana massacre in South Africa, or may be seen to facilitate violence to sustain 'order' - whether against criminals, foreigners, dissenting groups or gender-transgressive individuals. Democratisation may itself generate new social tensions and new forms of violence, and 'modernisation' and 'development' may forge new forms of dispossession, conflict and violence.



In all of these instances we need to rethink and disaggregate the state and its contradictory forms and practices, making use of or rethinking concepts such as 'violent pluralism', 'brown/grey zones' of politics where violence produces low-intensity citizenship, 'violent democracy' or 'disjunctive democracy'.

The citizen arises as a concept in the same moment as the modern state and reaches its fullest expression through the political form of democracy, constituted through participation, rights, obligations, reason and civility. Yet, the kinds of state practices described above give rise to differentiated regimes of subjecthood and citizenship in which democratic rights are unevenly distributed. Some citizens may be constituted as violent subjects, while others are constituted as targets of violence. Some citizens may be reduced to tribal subjects, while in other cases indigenous citizens may access richer rights to, for example, land, than those constituted as liberal citizens by formal constitutions.

Citizens are not simply passive elements, but actively participate in the regimes of governance that dominate them, seeking and claiming patronage, forging patriarchal, ethnic, territorial or religious identities that may circumscribe or exclude the citizenship rights of others, at times violently. In democracies, citizens may vote for violent and exclusionary regimes - whether these target the poor, or ethnic minorities, or indigenous groups, or those who are seen to contribute to disorder. The mobilisation for democratic claims may also be accompanied by violence against the state, or to maintain subaltern cohesion, and subaltern orders may themselves be constituted through processes of inclusion and exclusion.

This range of practices and actions from below not only constitutes citizens and subjectivities in ways that cannot be recognised by traditional social and political theory, but may also invoke or bring into being imagined or real states or state agencies or state officials that bear little resemblance to the classical social scientific conceptions of the state - though equally they may invoke the good state, the good official, the government that cares for its citizens, the state that listens, and brings development, or peace, or order, or prosperity.

Violence is integral to the making and unmaking of states, democracy, citizenship and subjecthood - and therefore of social order.

Violence may serve to sustain or restore existing orders, resist or disrupt them, or inaugurate or consolidate new and emerging orders - whether these are large-scale orders such as global capitalism and orders of elite domination in the nation states of the Global South, and national regimes of citizenship; or small-scale orders constituted by a local elites and hierarchies, or community formations threatened by crime or disturbed by outsiders or transgressive groups. Violence is, therefore, intimately related to questions of power, domination, resistance, order and disorder.



Recognising therefore that violence may be simultaneously related to social order and disorder, may have destructive and productive effects, may be both embraced and disavowed as a social process, and may be mobilised as a social resource by social subjects, community formations, elites and the state and its concomitant apparatuses; this colloquium is fundamentally concerned with the work that violence accomplishes.

To this end, the colloquium will animate engagements with these questions through discussions on gendered violence such as wartime rape; violence in the context of socio-economic precarity; social protest and violence; the intertwinements of states and local elites in violent enactments involving economic gain; citizenship and violence in the context of transnationalism and migration; violence as integral to states and their patronage networks; and violence as related to the constitution of particular social subjects.

PROGRAMME

WEDNESDAY | 21 AUGUST

14:15	Introduction Garth Stevens & Karl von Holdt
14:40	Tea
15:00	Marikana massacre Film: <i>Miners shot down</i>
16:30	Violent strikers Crispen Chinguno
16:45	Marikana as turning point? Karl von Holdt
17:00	Discussion
17:45	Closure

THURSDAY | 22 AUGUST

09:00	Opening
09:15	Violence pluralism and State peripheries <i>Enrique Desmond Arias</i> - Economies of Hybrid Governance on Colombia's National Periphery <i>Rahmane Idrissa</i> - Legitimate Violence? Questions (and some answers) from the 'Sahel' <i>Aninka Claassens</i> - The use of law to re-inscribe the boundaries of the Bantustans and to elicit and condone dispossession and violence in the periphery
10:15	Discussion
11:00	Tea
11:15	Nations and citizens: the state, borders and war <i>Garth Stevens</i> - Borders, bodies and barbarism: New statecraft, othering and the possibilities for violence in contemporary human mobility <i>Alice Mushagalusa</i> - Wartime rape in the Congo: from the destruction of symbolic goods to the accumulation of symbolic power - and the beginnings of symbolic resistance <i>Augusto Acácio</i> - Securitarian Democracy as framework for authoritarianism in the 21st century: the Brazilian case
12:15	Discussion
13:00	Lunch
14:00	Violent economies <i>Jacinto Cuivi</i> - The Economic Origins of Violence in Urban Latin America <i>Victor Munnik</i> - Ecological violence and coal in South Africa: an exploration
14:40	Discussion
15:15	Tea

15:30 **Violent economies** *cont.*

Kim Thomas - Breaking the cycles of gang violence: Findings from Cape Town, Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay

Javier Perez - On the hauntological poetics of embodied fugitivity: conjuring the spectres of slavery with (ex-) gangsters in the Cape

16:10 Discussion

16:45 Closure

17:00 Cocktails & Finger Supper

FRIDAY | 23 AUGUST

09:00 **Security, states and subjects**

Thiago Rodriguez and *Jędrzej Kotarski* - "*Militarem Ordinem*": urban (in)security and governmentality in Rio de Janeiro and Lima

Mahomoudou Savadogo - The gap between the modern state and Burkinabe society: an analysis of centre-periphery violence

Obvious Katsaura - On Violent Pentecostal Modernities

10:00 Discussion

10:45 Tea

11:00 **Popular justice and state justice**

Jorge Derpic - The prerogative to punish: mob violence and the clash between states and non-state systems of justice in rural Bolivia

Franziska Rueedi - Popular justice, violence and the mobilisation of emotions in 1990s Kathorus, South Africa

Nicholas Smith - The Risks and Rewards of Vigilantism in South Africa

12:00 Discussion

12:45 Lunch

13:45 **Popular violence and its intersection with the state**

Gema Kloppe-Santamaria - Between Civilization and Barbarity: Lynching and State Formation in Mexico

Daniel Nkhata - 'The occult and resistance to extraction: bloodsucker killings in rural Malawi'

14:25 Discussion

15:00 Tea

15:15 **Popular violence and its intersection with the state**

Jean-Pierre Misago and *Loren Landau* - Xenophobic violence, multi-level protection rackets, and the spatiality of syncretic citizenship

Karl von Holdt - Violent democracy: Elite formation, popular politics and violence in South Africa

15:55 Discussion

16:30 Wrap up | Desmond Arias, Rahmane Idrissa, Karl von Holdt/Garth Stevens

17:15 Closure

ABSTRACTS

Violence pluralism and State peripheries

Economies of Hybrid Governance on Colombia's National Periphery

Desmond Arias

ABSTRACT

For some time, Latin America-based scholars have developed close analyses of armed dynamics particularly in urban areas and the effect that they have on democratic practice in numerous countries. Missing from this analysis, largely because of the relatively intense focus on the cities where most homicides and the population are concentrated, is a clear discussion of how different regional and sub-regional economic dynamics produce varied governance dynamics in different locales. This paper, which builds on more than one hundred interviews in the Colombian countryside, focuses on two regions: Urabá, a drug and human smuggling transit region in the north, and Putumayo, a coca producing area in the south, to understand the different forms of non-state governance that operate in the country. The research revealed two key findings. The first is that all non-state governance, even that undertaken by guerilla armies, is deeply entangled with official state structures producing varied forms of hybrid governance. The second is that structures of hybrid governance in each region and in the municipalities of each region were driven by the particular regional and sub-regional economies that operate in those spaces. The paper will outline how both licit and illicit economic practices in each region produced and contributed to the varied hybrid governance structures that operate in the two regions. The analysis will provide a framework for considering both what drives different forms of governance in Colombia's regions but also will enable scholars to disaggregate the dynamics that underlie disjunctive democracy, violence pluralism, and grey areas in Latin America more broadly.

Legitimate Violence? Questions (and some answers) from the 'Sahel'

Rahmane Idrissa

ABSTRACT

Ultima ratio regum. These are the Latin words the Sun King Louis XIV had inscribed on the neck of his cannons. They mean 'the final argument of kings.' The power of the state is based on the final control of physical force, which constitutes two of its so-called 'regalian functions' (*fonctions régaliennes*), i.e., security (internal force) and defence (external force). In Weber's famous dictum, the state has the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force or violence. This is a statement about modern states, whose apparatus of force (police and other forces) are certainly (historically recent) claims to such a monopoly and attempts at being the final source of the physical violence in a polity. Thus, the struggle to control 'state power' is ultimately a struggle to control this final source of violence. My interest in this presentation - following a summer of research on the fraying edges of state control in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger - is about the 'legitimate' part of the Weberian dictum.

Is the violence of the state inherently legitimate (maybe because of a vital need people would have of a state)? Is it legitimate because the state has somehow (ideologically) managed to convince the populace that any violence wielded by it (or endorsed by it) is by definition legitimate? (In that light, organized internal violence against the state is delegitimised by terms such as 'rebellion' and 'terrorism'). Or are there ways in which the state needs to legitimize its ultima ratio?

The analysis of phenomena of organized internal (and transborder) violence in some parts of the three countries surveyed put these questions to the test in some burning ways. The violence can be parsed into anti-state violence which systematically targets state forces and services; non-state violence of diverse kinds, which may tactically target the state; and 'controlled' and 'uncontrolled' state violence (i.e., violence deployed directly by state forces, or by non-state forces endorsed by the state - which may be also categorized as a form of non-state violence). By looking into the histories of these various forms of violence, it appears that they pose complex questions about the legitimacy of violence and provide answers that challenge the premise that the state control of violence is inherently legitimate. To be sure, these questions and answers are related to the capacities of the states in the Sahel, which are at the same time quite limited and yet very important in the roles that they give to states; and to the political integration of the polity ('nations') that are run by those states. So, they may be quite contingent (i.e., limited to situations in this part of the world), although I do not think so.


The presentation, at any rate, will be about a work in progress. It will rely on a theory of the modern state that is derived from the observation of the states in the region surveyed, in particular highlighting the difference between the 'regalian state' (the state of defence, security, finance, justice, mint, and diplomacy) and the 'service state' (the state of social, development, and environmental policy) in a context of non-industrialised, 'traditional' political economy and elitist democracy. In this configuration, the regalian state is at the service of the elite - and the focus of their factional competition - while the service state is largely in the inadequate hands of international bodies and NGOs. Democracy and decentralization are supposed to animate the rest of society in its interactions with both aspects of the state. I will read the above-mentioned histories of violence and interpret the trajectories of the various sources of violence through the filter of this vision of the modern state in the 'Sahel.'

The use of law to re-inscribe the boundaries of the Bantustans and to elicit and condone dispossession and violence in the periphery

Aninka Claassens

ABSTRACT

The paper will speak to laws about traditional leadership and 'communal' land that the state has attempted to enact (in some cases successfully) between 2002 and 2019. These laws default to colonial and apartheid justifications for denying the property rights and decision-making authority of the 18 million South Africans living in the former 'homelands'. The laws resuscitate the controversial tribal boundaries put in place by the much resisted Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and deem all those living within these boundaries to be 'subjects' of the traditional leadership lineages recognised during colonialism and apartheid.

A red line starts at the top left, curves down, then goes straight down, then diagonally down to the right, ending near the top right of the page.

The laws attempt to vest sole decision-making authority over land in traditional leaders, as opposed to the people who have occupied and inherited the land over generations. They have been strongly resisted, including in the courts, and traditional leaders currently do not have legal authority to sign mining and other investment deals with third parties without the consent of the people whose land rights are at issue. A bill rammed through the National Assembly just before the 2019 elections would give them this authority for the first time.

Despite this government has treated traditional leaders as if they were the owners of communal land and encouraged them to sign deals with mining houses and external investors. It has systematically failed to protect vulnerable land rights as required by sections 25(6) and (9) of the Constitution and the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act of 1996.


Violence was built into the package of bills from their inception at the insistence of the traditional leader lobby. The Traditional Courts bill vested far-reaching punitive powers in traditional leaders and prohibited people from 'opting out' of disputed tribal boundaries and accessing state courts instead of traditional courts. The traditional leader lobby also argued for a separate 'traditional police force' from early on. A pilot programme rolling out police stations based in royal palaces has started in the Eastern Cape (Daily Dispatch).

The paper describes the looting of billions of rand from impoverished rural groups in North West, a lease signed by a Xhosa king with a Chinese company in which the king agrees to remove the occupants of 30 kilometres of coast line around Port St Johns in exchange for rent of only a million rand a year. It describes the widespread demand by traditional leaders that people pay for land they already own and the targeting and assassination of activists as well as the torching of the palaces and offices of traditional leaders.

Most of this is taking place 'outside' the law as attempts to pass particular laws have failed due to the fact that they are in flagrant breach of the Constitution. But Members of Parliament and the traditional leader lobby refuse to engage with this contradiction. Their attitude is to stare down the Constitution on the basis that 'African tradition' must be upheld at all costs. Current attempts to ram the Traditional Courts Bill through parliament indicate that government is well aware that insofar as law enables dispossession it must also enable violence to contain resistance.

The large amounts of money lost and minerals illegally shipped out of SA would not be possible without active state collusion. The content of the bills before Parliament and the repressive way in which rural people opposing the bills are treated during public hearings shows clearly that a policy position has been taken to exclude ordinary people from the both the negotiation of mining deals and any benefits accruing from mining.

The paper will discuss Mining Minister Gwede Mantashe's statements about Xolobeni after its legal victory against the granting of a mining right without the consent of affected land rights holders. Beyond characterising the Xolobeni people as merely 'subjects' he describes them as unruly, irrational, violent, disobedient and anti-development. He has stated that if law requires the consent of communities, all mining in South Africa will come to a halt. He insists that unless the state has the sole prerogative to grant mining licences corruption will flourish.



The state operates as the fulcrum of competing vested interests including those of mining capital and a traditional leader lobby with strong Bantustan antecedents especially in the platinum rich northern provinces. Violence and dispossession is not, however, limited to mineral rich areas. There has been a resurgence in the practice of extorting tribal levies and payments for land across all the former homelands, backed by threats of, and incidents of violence.

The laws will not survive in the longer term because of the Constitution. But in the meantime they elicit corruption and foster violent repression by creating a culture of impunity. They provide a veneer of legality to legally precarious mining deals in the former homelands and will do the work of dispossessing hundreds of thousands of the most marginalised South Africans and destroying their land and water resources before court challenges reach the Constitutional Court in 5 to 10 years time.

Nations and citizens: the state, borders and war

Borders, bodies and barbarism: New statecraft, othering and the possibilities for violence in contemporary human mobility

Garth Stevens

ABSTRACT

Governing human mobility will become one of the most significant features of the 21st century, primarily because migration is both a consequential outcome of the period of late capital, but also because its surveillance and governance is central to an established political economy and is increasingly connected to contemporary statecraft. Violence, counter-violence and the associated risks for bodily harm are an intractable and embedded feature of this governance regime. This paper examines how violence, counter-violence and the risks for bodily harm become possible within the context of global migration, both from the perspective of those attempting to enter, and those attempting to insulate, host countries. I discuss the reproduction of racialized *othering* and subjecthood inside dominant social and political responses to migrancy, as a new mode of contemporary statecraft that allows violence to be enacted against those who have uneven access to citizenship rights.

I also argue for disturbing traditional conceptualizations and re-engaging with questions of morality and its contingent relationship to the value of human life, embodied risk-taking enactments, and effectively resonant practices as waves of shared public sentiment, that make violent, counter-violent and self-harming encounters possible in the context of global migrations.



Wartime rape: from the destruction of symbolic goods to the accumulation of symbolic power - and the beginnings of symbolic resistance

Alice Mushagalusa

ABSTRACT

In Pierre Bourdieu's *Masculine Domination*, patriarchy has been presented as a 'model par excellence' of symbolic violence; a type of violence that self-reproduces through its victims' daily habitus. The 'softness' of this form of violence renders it *invisible and therefore impossible to be challenged by those who undergo it*; Bourdieu suggests. But, what if the invisible is made visible when the physical merges with the symbolic; making it possible therefore for the latter to be challenged?

Based on the example of wartime rape as experienced by the eastern DRC population during the sixteen years old civil war, this paper aims to present how the symbolic violence of patriarchy came to lose its softness and hiddenness when patriarchal norms came to be associated with wartime rape within the studied area. Therefore, based on the analysis of collected data, this paper aims to present the meaning produced through the rape of women by armed forces during wartime.

Using Bourdieu's conceptualization of symbolic goods; I suggest that through the rape of women - who are presented as symbolic goods in a patriarchal field - of the enemy group, perpetrators intend at first to *destroy* the symbolic capital of their male counterparts. This was revealed through the rape of Congolese women by foreign armed forces among which were the Interahamwe militias from Rwanda.

Secondly, based on the analysis of the rape committed by the Congolese militias against their own population, this paper attempts to move away from Bourdieu's analysis of the argumentation of symbolic capital through marrying, by suggesting that through the destruction of their enemy's symbolic goods accomplished by the rape of their women, the militia perpetrators accumulate new form of symbolic capital or goods. However, contrarily to Bourdieu, the symbolic goods accumulated here are not women rather the status of an armed force and therefore recognition by the state - also within a patriarchal field.

Nevertheless, whilst war rape is used by perpetrators to impose their own symbolic power/order upon the male from the oppressed group through the destruction of the dominated symbolic good, it is also suggested that the symbolic dimensions of wartime rape have worked in such a way that rape; a physical violence, has made visible the symbolic violence of patriarchal norms shared by both the perpetrators and the defending forces. Consequently, this has planted the seeds of resistance to patriarchy by women within the survivor community. In short, this paper suggests that a physical violence (wartime rape in this case) can reveal the symbolic dimensions of patriarchy, in response to which a symbolic order from below, that of the oppressed women, can emerge as a result of collective consciousness.



Securitarian Democracy as framework for the authoritarianism in the 21st century: the Brazilian case

Acácio Augusto

ABSTRACT

The present work aims to expose the partial result of the academic work "Security policies: the transterritorial aspect of security democracy", developed by LASInTec. It demonstrates how security has become the shape of the democratic regime, nowadays in Brazil, building a new kind of authoritarianism, different from the dictatorship during the 20th century. The analysis is structured as follows: firstly, how the political, technical, analytical and theoretical undefined limit between international security and public safety has become an issue; secondly, the raising of security as a central value in modern society changing the usual shape of democracy and creating new political arrangements. And, finally, it will be described how according to studies around the concept of neoliberal rationality, safety policies and monitoring activities are producing this rearrangements, throughout the increasing of military and police force and judicial power acting. This political practice within the democratic regime is directly related to the police-citizen's constitution of subjectivity who voluntarily collaborate with the security forces. The whole scenario has been analyzed under the light of three specific concepts, they are: "neoliberal governmentality" from Michael Foucault, "centaur State" from Loic Wacquant and "necropolitics" from Achille Mbembe. In order to demonstrate the hypothesis in which this idea is organized, I am going to show how the security apparatus and judicial norms are aimed to battle the organized crime and corruption in Brazil during the last 30 years. It will be given special attention to the production of the activities mentioned above in the period when mega events such as the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016 took place in Brazil. And to the law projects from the extreme right-wing government that took off in January 2019. To finish, I am going to point out some possible ways to resist the security apparatus making use of anarchists and autonomists self defence tactics and anti-security.

Violent economies

The Economic Origins of Violence in Urban Latin America

Jacinto Cuivi

ABSTRACT

As political violence receded across Latin America following the transition to democracy in the 1980s, criminal violence skyrocketed. In the media, violence is often attributed to drug-trafficking, and social scientific research supports this connection. However, other forms of criminal violence, including mugging, kidnapping, and burglary, also increased. These crimes are often motivated by the prospect of economic gain, but a systematic account of their economic origins is still missing.

I hypothesize that the increase in criminal violence across Latin America results from the process of economic restructuring that began in the 1970s. Until then, the informal economy offered sufficient income-making opportunities to urban workers who lacked the skills, networks, and credentials to find employment in the formal labour market. Informal labour thus served as a safety net during hard times. However, the informal economy was dependent on the domestic manufacturing sector, which outsourced production to, and stimulated consumption from, informal businesses. As Latin American economies deindustrialized, informal economies became more isolated and atomized. This created the conditions for the transition of a sizeable share of the informal workforce to violent crime during crises.

To establish the link between deindustrialization and violence, I will combine statistical data, interviews, and historical case studies. First, I will compile country-level data on industrial production and violent crime in the region over the last 50 years and use these data to map the transformation of Latin America. Drawing on newspaper archives, secondary sources, and survey data, I will then analyze these trends in the city of São Paulo, Brazil. After reconstructing the city's structural transformation, I will interview informal workers and ex-convicts to retrace their life stories, map the income-making opportunities available to them over time, and probe their perceptions of boundaries between informality and criminality. I will also test the relationship between decline in industrial activity and crime rates in the state. Finally, I will compare the experience of São Paulo with Quito, Ecuador, to increase generalizability.

The overall objective of this research program is to probe the link between economic restructuring and violent crime. The specific aims are to show (1) that deindustrialization transformed informal economies in Latin American cities, (2) that, as a result, the urban poor faced shrinking income-making opportunities and experienced work situations less likely to integrate them to the rest of society, and (3) that, in this context, informal workers increasingly resorted to economic crime during hard times.


If obtained, these results will shed new light on the scholarly and policy debate about violence in the region and help debunk stereotypes of Latin American societies as inherently violent owing to ancestral values and traditions. They will also lay the basis for a better understanding of the changes informal economies are undergoing in other parts of the world-where there has been less research on the subject-and of their impacts on urban life.

Ecological violence and coal in South Africa: an exploration

Victor Munnik

ABSTRACT

South African electricity and fuel production are heavily (more than 90%) dependent on coal. Pressures to deal with climate change (SA is one of 20 most carbon intensive economies in the world) and a deeply troubled electricity parastatal Eskom, have recently propelled coal issues into national debates. Drawing on participatory action research with communities on the Mpumalanga Highveld, where the majority of coal is mined, as well as in KwaZulu-Natal (Somkhele area) and Limpopo (Waterberg coalfield) about coal impacts and transition, this study explores the concept of ecological violence, in dialogue with other research into violence in the "Violent States, States of violence" project.

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Ecological violence has been recognised as 'slow and invisible' as it reaches into and poisons the very web of life. It undermines a sense of self and community as toxic uncertainties set in. Polluted people experience that they are sacrificed by the rest of society. But coal violence is also immediate, large scale and spectacular. Multiple violences can be ascribed to coal: the degradation of soil and water; death and disease as a result of air pollution, the destruction of property and assassination of activists, dispossession and forced relocation, the spiritual violence of grave desecration, and a cognitive violence that imposes monetary valuations and disregards alternative lifeworlds. The violences of coal raise important questions for an understanding of the concept of ecological violence.

While big corporations practice a politics of knowledge that creates toxic uncertainty, this terrain has become a site of struggle, addressed by citizens science and international networks of solidarity. To what extent does struggle transform violence in this case? And while we can recognise individual responses and isolated suffering, there are also growing chains of solidarity in coal controversies. This is in no small measure the result of global climate change concerns, and resulting support to activism, not only in terms of funding, but also political pressures at many levels. The violence of climate change is caused by many actions and decisions, although it arguably works through a single, huge physical mechanism of 'the global weather system'. Equally, the violences of coal flow into each other, as violence in the landscape, on people's bodies, livelihoods and minds, as well as the rapidly increasing impacts of climate change, are interlinked in struggles about decision making around the use of coal. And finally: what does this mean for political debate when what some regard as an everyday, useful activity - generating electricity from coal - is described as violent?

Breaking the cycles of gang violence: Findings from Cape Town, Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay

Kim Thomas

ABSTRACT

The Cape Flats are currently experiencing an extreme period of gang violence in which over 900 people were murdered in the first half of 2019. This gang phenomena and its related violence is not recent, nor is it unique to Cape Town, but recent gang 'wars' should be seen as an intersection between global factors: increased drug production, national factors: the breakdown in policing, corruption and increased access to firearms, and local factors: social and economic exclusion. Emerging gang dynamics are a feature of how these factors interact and increasingly how different areas in South Africa interact with each other. While past academic literature has correctly focused a lot on exclusion, it has missed the opportunity to analyze the fundamental shifts in criminal economies in the country. We follow the evolution of gangs in three South African cities: Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay and Cape Town.

Analysing the evolution of gangs in these three cities is done based on in-depth interviews with various stakeholders including police, community leaders, activists, gang leaders and members, and residents of gang-affected areas. These interviews are reviewed within a context of academic literature and media reports. Our research explores the evolution of these gangs along with the commonalities and differences of gang dynamics in the different cities. Similarities across cities are mostly situated in their dynamics and power structures: the

constant changes as they fragment and consolidate based on altering alliances and access to illicit assets, and the growing connections between gangs in different parts of the country, for example in the recruiting of hitmen from other provinces for professional assassinations. Differences are mostly related to varying economic opportunities such as the different criminal markets and types of corruption.

If these evolving gang dynamics and growing networks are not addressed now, they will evolve into a much wider national challenge. We argue for a unified national state response focusing on addressing the drivers of gang violence, including improved firearm control, adequately addressing police corruption at all levels, a health centered approach to drug use, and a significant investment in youth related activities.

On the hauntological poetics of embodied fugitivity: Conjuring the spectres of slavery with (ex-) gangsters in the Cape

Javier Perez

ABSTRACT

Between 1658-1834, slavery in the Cape Colony established a foundation from which future systems of racialised inequality - most notably, Apartheid - would subsequently emerge. Forcibly transported from a diverse range of origins across the Indian Ocean, slaves served as the main labour force in the Colony but would eventually form a common socioeconomic identity alongside the enserfed indigenous Khoisan. Today, the descendants of the enslaved and the enserfed Khoisan peoples experience extraordinarily disproportionate rates of incarceration: 'Coloured' men are currently imprisoned at twelve times the rate of white men and double the rate of Black (i.e. non-'Coloured') men. This paper re-situates the modern Cape 'Coloured'¹ gang within the broader historical dialectics of racialisation and creolisation, which respectively encompasses a dialectic of criminalisation and *marronage*, traversing from colonial slavery until the modern prison regime. This paper applies Edouard Glissant's trope of *marronage* - the flight of escaped slaves - to revisit the links between colonial-era runaway slaves ('droster² gangs') and modern Cape gangs towards reimagining the latter as engaged in a tradition of *opacity-making* - the production of complex structures of density and unknowability against the particular epistemic violence imposed upon 'Coloured-ness'. It explores an alternative understanding of gang culture as a social production by bodies haunted by the spectres of slavery and *marronage*, going beyond the lexicons of criminality, on the one extreme, and resistance, on the other. Gangsterism is contextualized within the historical processes of creolisation, positing gangs on the Cape Flats as forged productively within and oppositionally against histories of racialised criminalisation. Building upon Derridean hauntology, it explores the question: to what extent have the dual ghosts of *slavery and drosting* become enfolded assemblages that demarcate the modern Cape Flats gang as a space for creative divergence of criminalisation and embodiment of the potentiality of freedom? Whereas the drosters took the mountains to evade oppression and form alternative modalities of being, the descendant gangsters of today go to the prisons where they notoriously

- 1 The term differs from the American context; in South Africa, 'Coloured' refers to a very particular racial group and classification based on mixed ancestry. This paper assumes a rather complex view that neither sees 'Coloured' identity as the product of miscegenation nor the result of white-imposed conditions, acknowledging rather 'Coloureds'' role in their own cultural formation as far back as the slave era. More specifically, this paper relies heavily on Zimitri Erasmus' (2017) formulation of 'Coloured' *creolization*.
- 2 An 18th century term referring to runaway slaves and escapee Khoe (indigenous) enserfed servants.

construct their alternative belongings and identities. This paper concludes with an overview of the research project's experimental multidisciplinary methodology, which uses poetry and performance workshops with both currently- and formerly-incarcerated participants. More specifically, the workshops focused on performative embodiments of history, ancestry, memory and marronage. The incarcerated deconstruct and re-author the meanings underlying gangsterism, carcerality, and stigmatized identities (e.g. being 'gham'). The project used songs, rituals, embodied explorations, and mother-tongue idioms toward a self-excavation of embodiments of historical memory, including the silencing of this memory.

Security, states and the subjects

“Militarem Ordinem”: urban (in)security and governmentality in Rio de Janeiro and Lima

Thiago Rodriguez & Jędrzej Kotarski

ABSTRACT

Since the so-called re-democratization process in Brazil, during the 1980s, the issue of public safety/security has emerged as one of the main national concerns. The economic growth has been followed by an impressive inequality gap that could not be effectively tackled even by progressive administrations in the beginning of this century. As a consequence, the demands for “more security” has risen from different social backgrounds, from upper and middle classes to impoverished urban populations. The influence of international policing and criminal justice models, such as the US’ zero tolerance, has been combined with previous local mechanisms of repression and criminal selectivity tinted by historical practices of racism, sexism and classism. In the public safety domain, there is an increasing presence of armed forces in urban policing and township (“favelas”) occupation, as well as the growing militarization of police corporations and private security companies. In Peru, a similar process took place at the poor neighbourhood of Villa San Salvador, where the presence of the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla, during the 1990s, has led to an increasing presence of military forces disputing territory with that armed group. This presentation will introduce the concept of “militarem ordinem” to analyze pacification operations led by the Armed Forces in two sets of townships in Rio de Janeiro - “Alemão” and “Penha” (2010-2012) and “Maré” (2014-2015) - and the Peruvian Armed Forces in Villa San Salvador. This concept follows suggestions by Stephen Graham on “urban militarism”, Michelle Alexander on “drugs and racism”, Achille Mbembe on “necropolitics”, as well as Desmond Arias & Goldstein insights on “violent pluralism” to present a notion of militarization that goes beyond the military corporations themselves in order to become a subjectification process that affects the police, the military, private security agents, and the ordinary citizen (from all backgrounds). I claim that through this concept, it is possible to understand the widespread conservative urge for repression and violence, and the increasing tolerance with the selective imprisonment, social control and assassination of young and poor people in contemporary Brazil and Peru.

The gap between the modern state and Burkinabe society: an analysis of centre-periphery violence

Mahamoudou Savadogo

ABSTRACT

The regional instability in large swathes of West Africa that came from the collapse of Libya's regime in 2011 has led to serious phenomena of destabilization of states in the Sahel region - especially Mali, but also Burkina Faso and (more marginally) Niger. This can be seen through the proliferation of violent organizations - some with extremist agendas - in the region. Burkina Faso, which for some time had escaped this phenomenon, has seen its socio-political organization gradually eroded by the political upheavals that the country experienced following a popular insurrection that ended the 27-year rule of President Compaoré in late 2014. Since then, a shifting, precarious security environment has emerged within Burkinabe society, characterized by a multiplicity of threats. Thus, since 2016, Burkina Faso has been living under the menace of terrorist groups from Mali that have found in the Burkinabe Sahel region a suitable breeding ground for development. Gradually, terrorism has become endogenous, embodied by certain Burkinabe figures such as the late Imam Malam Dicko. This man's influence grew in Soum, a province in the Sahel region, where his organization, Ansarul Islam, tried to impose itself against the state. In 2017, the threat spread to some of the neighbouring regions, and by 2018, areas in the north, much of the east, and large parts of the central-north (not very far from the capital Ouagadougou) have become, to an extent, strongholds of terrorism.

How could these terrorist groups have taken root so rapidly in Burkina Faso? This is not an easy question because violent extremism and its expansion have many causes. But I am proposing that the state and its underpinning elements are one key causal factor. In this light, I hypothesize that the violent crisis in many Burkina regions signals flaws in the structures of the modern apparatus of the state, a weakening of the idea of the nation-state, most importantly a calling into question of the kind of order that emerged from the uprising of 2014, state violence and governance failures in the relations between the centre and the periphery, and generally, the weak presence of a state apparatus that still in a process of rebuilding (following the collapse of the Compaoré regime/state in 2014). These are all factors that have further widened the gap that already existed between state and society, especially society in the rural areas. This vacant space between the rulers and the governed was occupied in short order by several worrying phenomena, including violent extremism, self-defence groups, community tensions, and especially local armed insurgencies (this latter phenomenon being the least well understood in my experience).

My goal is to present and discuss these phenomena, which have different regional stresses. Thus, in the North and the Sahel, the very weak presence - even absence - of state services has stimulated the rise of radical ideologies and the emergence of terrorist groups which further weaken the presence of the state, leading to its negation and rejection by local populations. In the East and Centre-North, there is the phenomenon of self-defence groups known as '*koglweegos*' (a Moore word) that challenge the state's monopoly on legitimate physical violence. In these places, a chastened state has found itself in the position of subcontracting the public good of security provision, which is supposedly its sovereign responsibility, to these groups. Faced with a weakened state, terrorist groups feel therefore emboldened to impose a new social and societal order by gradually eliminating Burkina state administration and taking control of local economic resources, including artisanal gold mines, something which stoked a local armed insurrection in the East. The role(s) of the state is the common denominator in these different dynamics, and needs to be analysed.

On Violent Pentecostal Modernities

Obvious Katsaura

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the imbrication of Pentecostalism with violence in African urban contexts characterized Pentecostal proliferation, widespread precarity and “neglectful”, severely limited or “weak” states. Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Lagos and Johannesburg, the paper investigates the ways in which Pentecostal churches aggressively, and sometimes violently, occupy, use and refashion urban physical space through practices of real estate and evangelism. In this case, the Pentecostal church institution is considered to be a “violent actor” in urban space--to be a central bank of the “capital of violence”, so to speak.

Attendant to this, the paper examines the role of Pentecostalism in the militarization, rather than pacification, of its followership. Whereas Christianity has traditionally been associated with the reproduction of docile citizens and subjects, it is important to note the appropriation and deployment of violent lingo in Pentecostal practices of prayer and evangelism--the ideas of “spiritual warfare”, “machine-gun prayer” (cf. Marshall 2009) and “Pentecostal dominionism” being cases in point. This observation, if we also consider the rise of militant Islam, suggests the increasing significance of violent forms of religious life and expression in the reproduction of selfhoods. The Pentecostal appropriation of violent lingo and practices, arguably, resonate with the violent spaces and places traversed and inhabited by the religion; while the religion paradoxically presents itself as a panacea for the same.

Popular justice and state justice

The prerogative to punish. Mob-violence and the clashes between state and non-state systems of justice in contemporary rural Bolivia

Jorge Derpic

ABSTRACT

Within the last two decades, scholars studying mob-violence in response to crime in urban and rural Latin America have challenged the association between these acts of violence and indigenous-customary justice. While public media outlets and citizens living in well-off urban areas tended to establish quick associations between collective violence and long-term cultural repertoires of conflict resolution, scholars and human rights activists pointed to the inadequacy of such links. In Bolivia, where the constitution officially recognizes so-called Indigenous, Peasant, and Native Justice (or JIOC, by its acronym in Spanish), some scholars have sought to dissociate JIOC from violence by highlighting the former's pacific, restorative, and inclusive nature. Others, in turn, argue that residents from marginal urban and rural areas only use the term as a synonym of mob-violence as a resource to make sense of the uncertainty and socioeconomic precarity that surrounds them. Building upon these views this paper analyzes how individuals who directly or indirectly participated in three events of mob-violence that took place in rural Bolivia between 2009 and 2013 made sense of these



acts by framing some of them as expressions of JIOC. At the same time, this paper delves deeper into how and with what outcomes inhabitants of these rural areas engaged with the state either to prevent the escalation of extra-judicial violence, or on the contrary, to boycott the attempts of the state to punish the perpetrators of these acts. Based on in-depth analysis of the pretrial investigation case-files, this paper finds that participants in acts of mob-violence at times mobilize JIOC to justify these acts, thus challenging the state prerogatives on legitimate violence. At other times, however, some of these same participants do reach out to the state either to prevent the escalation of the extra-judicial punishment of alleged criminals or to seek restitution for these acts within the ordinary justice system.

Popular justice, violence and the mobilisation of emotions in 1990s Kathorus, South Africa

Franziska Rueedi

ABSTRACT

During the final years of white minority rule in South Africa collective violence escalated, plunging parts of the country into a state of civil war. Estimates suggest that between 16,000 and 20,000 people lost their lives during the years leading up to the first democratic elections. The abolition of influx control in 1986 promoted the migration of rural migrants to the hostels around Johannesburg, leading to severe overcrowding, a fierce struggle over resources and a shift in gender relations. Competing visions of nationalism and alienation from trade unionism, a crisis of patriarchy, the marginalization of migrant workers, eroding networks of solidarity and rivalries between taxi associations further provided the bedrock of the emerging violent conflict. Conflict was also structured along generational lines. While most violence was perpetrated in the of the ANC and the IFP respectively, with the security forces stoking the flames, the reasons why people participated remains underexplored.

One region where violence was particularly acute was the East Rand (now Ekurhuleni) east of Johannesburg, with the African townships of Thokoza, Katlehong and Vosloorus forming the epicentre of violent conflict. Drawing on archival research and oral history interviews with participants in the conflict, this paper focuses on violence as a form of popular justice and punishment and investigates the role emotions played in shaping collective violence in this region. Within a context of rapid social and political change, and a pronounced lack of everyday policing of violent crime, collective violence served as a means of establishing social control and discipline those who were seen to be violating the perceived interests of communities. Anger over the inversion of social hierarchies, fear of expulsion from urban areas and feelings of revenge all fed into escalating violence during this period and undergirded beliefs that justice had to be sought by popular means.

The Risks and Rewards of Vigilantism in South Africa

Nicholas Rush Smith

ABSTRACT

Why would anyone participate in vigilantism given its risks? By examining the case of a KwaMashu street committee leader who was shot allegedly because of his crime-fighting work, this chapter shows that forceful crime-fighting offers emotional rewards. Specifically, fighting crime combats feelings of disempowerment produced by the fear of crime by providing a "pleasure of agency" (Wood 2003). These feelings, in turn, are promoted by the state's encouragement of crime fighting as a means for citizens to take back control of their communities from criminals. To the street committee leader, participating in the street committee meant being a good community member, a good African National Congress member, and a good citizen. Therefore, vigilantism emerges amidst robust associational bonds often connected to high levels of social capital and reductions in violence. However, the chapter also shows that such informal crime-fighting is premised on a contradictory form of social capital that has equally contradictory effects on violence. Ironically, the street committee leader's civic commitments made him comfortable with violence against neighbourhood residents who violated the moral tenets of the local imagined community - contradictions that are heightened by the state's promotion of such crime fighting.

Popular violence and its intersection with the state

Between Civilization and Barbarity: Lynching and State Formation in Mexico

Gema Kloppe-Santamaría

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to examine the impact that Mexico's process of state formation had in the organization and legitimation of lynching. Drawing on several cases of mob violence taking place during the post-revolutionary period (1930s-1950s), the paper identifies and examines three modalities of lynching that involved state actors and local authorities, either as victims or as perpetrators of mob violence. These modalities of lynching can be classified as follows: lynching as resistance, lynching as corrective justice, and state-sanctioned lynching. Each one of these modalities reveals particular patterns of resistance and negotiation between communities and the state, as well as specific patterns of hegemony and coercion on behalf of state actors.

The first - lynching as resistance - entails the lynching of those state actors that represented the state's efforts to modernize and secularize local communities. In this case, lynching emerges as a means to resist the encroachment of the post-revolutionary state into communal life as well as a means to assert communities' right to decide over matters such as education, religion, sanitation, and land distribution.

The second modality - lynching as corrective justice - corresponds to lynchings that targeted officials and power figures that were, either *de jure* or *de facto*, responsible for enforcing social control within communities and neighbourhoods. These include attacks against soldiers, police officials, mayors, and caciques that were lynched either because they had abused their authority or because, in the eyes of the community, they had unjustly punished a wrongdoer. The third modality - state sanctioned lynching - refers to lynchings perpetrated by, or in conjunction with, state authorities, mainly mayors but also soldiers and police officers. These cases entailed the killing of so-called criminals or political enemies through the use of visible and cruel forms of torment; or, in other cases, the collaboration of public officials and citizens who, in the face of an alleged criminal or wrongdoer, considered lynching an appropriate and legitimate form of punishment.

The argument of the paper is two-fold. First that the encroachment of the post-revolutionary state into communal life, together with the behaviour of public officials that were considered abusive or intrusive, contributed to the precipitation of lynching. In this sense, counter to what classic sociological theories would predict, the greater presence of state authorities at the local level did not bring about a decrease in extralegal, overt, and public forms of violence such as lynching. Rather, it was conducive to its occurrence as well as to its legitimization in the eyes of perpetrators who perceived state authorities as intrusive or unfair.


Secondly, the paper argues that the three modalities of lynching described above - particularly the third one - highlight the fact that mob violence was not averted by public officials but was actually promoted as a form of governance and social control. Surely, central elites were quick to dismiss the violence promoted by mayors and municipal police officers as a sign of the backwardness of rural communities. However, rather than reflecting communities' so-called atavistic traditions, these instances of mob violence were symptomatic of the ways in which state authority was forged at the local level with the acquiescence of state and federal elites. In sum, the third modality of lynching shows that a traditional dichotomous understanding of state formation - where the "state" stands for modernity, and "communities" for barbarity - is empirically and historically wrong.

The occult and resistance to "symbolic extraction": bloodsucker killings in rural Malawi

Daniel Kabunduli Nkhata

ABSTRACT

From 2016 - 2018, Malawi grappled with occurrences of bloodsucking rumours that erupted in Mulanje, one of the rural and tea growing districts in Malawi but also spread to three other districts within the Southern region of this Southern African Country. More than four occurrences have happened, in 2000, 2002, 2009 including the most recent ones of 2016 - 2018 (Chikoja, 2009). For the first three occurrences, rumours circulated and caused community panic for almost a month but the government contained them. Observers noted that rumours were a reflection of social distress due to the famine and economic crisis in the concerned years. The 2009 occurrences generated wide interest because of a man called Jack Bandawe, christened "The Beast of Ndirande" who pleaded guilty to murder and bloodsucking accounts, but also implicated businessmen and politicians believed to have been buying blood at 100 000 Malawi Kwacha (about \$140) per victim (Chikoja, 2010; Tenthani, 2010).



Unlike the previous occurrences of bloodsucker rumours, the 2016-2018 rumours erupted in a different context where Malawi had registered some significant economic gains, enjoyed spells of stability, recorded improved literacy rates but also registered a bumper maize harvest (Mvundula, 2018). Again, unlike the previous occurrences where communities were panicking in silence, in 2016-2018, they organised marches to the district Assemblies and to their traditional chiefs. These marches emerged from discussions communities had in homes, churches, schools, at boreholes, women's clubs and football matches. Few weeks after rumour circulated of the first case of bloodsucking, Mulanje registered 13 village-based marches, and 48 episodes of violence related to bloodsucking stories in two different Traditional Authorities (Mulanje police monthly report, March 2016).

These marches were primarily convened to vent concerns of community insecurity to bloodsuckers but later turned out to become a protest to erratic rural policing by the police, delays in processing court cases of suspected bloodsuckers, poor service delivery by local government, the "illegal" extractive industries by foreign companies, precarious working conditions on tea estates, and the sucking nature of media coverage of the bloodsuckers' stories. From these marches also emerged exceptional levels of violence reflected in the killing of suspected bloodsuckers. For example, violent attacks were unleashed on "bloodsuckers" such as white tea plantation managers, tourists, journalists, state security agents, local businessmen, politicians, oil exploration engineers, and engineers working on the water extraction project from Mulanje Mountain. All these categories of people were attacked in a narrative of bloodsuckers. Marching communities also stoned buildings, chanted obscene songs, erected barricades, invaded shops, and torched houses of suspected bloodsuckers and those of traditional chiefs. Three chiefs, Traditional Authority Nazombe and Group Village Headmen Khatingo and Chizinga were killed by angry mobs on allegations that they were hiding bloodsuckers. To contain the marches, the state through police also used violence such as arbitrary arrests, intimidation, abductions, and illegal raids of homes at night.

This research paper used primary qualitative data from an extensive fieldwork in Mulanje district to explore these violent anti-bloodsucker protests in-order to understand precarity relating to material deprivation caused by perceived "extractive" socio-economic and political relations. The research also investigates how violence emerged and illuminated the meaning making of these communities. One of the arguments raised in this research is that the 2016-2018 occurrences had a complex texture of issues shaping them. The events represented deep-seated issues ingrained in fractured relations between different groups such as but not limited to the state and citizens, chiefs and subjects, and "sucking" journalists and protestors. Consequently, the protests were then not random, unorganised, and ludicrous events but collective social action against precarious livelihoods, perceived injustices, violence, displacement, and unfulfilled promises by leaders.

One can argue that communities protested against structures perceived to align, represent and reflect extraction within the narrative of occult figures of bloodsucking vampires. These community targets were not fixed, in some instances communities framed new targets based on the context of rumour. They understood their struggle and public performance as a protest. This research is not an exhaustive study on protest dynamics, but rather attempts to explore both the illuminating role of violence and how community power frameworks, fractures and material conditions all interacted in the 2016-2018 bloodsucker occurrences.

Xenophobic violence, multi-level protection rackets, and the spatiality of syncretic citizenship

Jean Pierre Misago & Loren B. Landau

ABSTRACT

Violence against non-citizens and other 'outsiders' has become a regular and highly visible feature of South Africa's political landscape. Scholarly and activist condemnation as a human rights violation and by others as a natural response to urban economic precarity hides its political motivations and significance. Drawing on over ten years of political ethnographies across the country, this paper argues that 'xenophobic violence' is part of an emergent order founded on multi-directional criminal politics involving protection rackets and state complicity in a form of indirect rule. Capitalising on the political distance of official leaders resulting from the party list system, the relative decline of local party offices, and rapid urban population growth, local figures have sought to establish power and authority by mobilising both against and, oddly, for migrant populations. On one hand, local leaders use them as a resource to channel discontent and provide material resources (payoffs, attached houses, looted goods). The violence and authority associated with these mobilisations then positions leaders to extract resources from the formal state. These take the forms of direct investments, moneys to 'reintegrate' displaced migrants, and - most importantly - recognition and political legitimacy. In this way, the formal state both recognises and relies on these leaders to maintain order. People living within this regime are subsequently part of a syncretic citizenship that fuses elements of the formal constitutional order with spatially defined systems of rights and resource allocations. The effectiveness of these mechanisms of indirect rule to promote the interests of particular leaders creates incentives for their proliferation across South Africa's rapidly transforming urban landscape.

Violent democracy: Elite formation, popular politics and violence in South Africa


Karl von Holdt

ABSTRACT

South Africa 1990-94: a **moment of decolonisation**, which unleashes multiple processes of change and struggle. In this paper, I explore the dynamics of violence involved in a particular form of popular politics that has emerged at the interface between the state and many communities. It is a form of popular politics that combines community protest, elite formation and violence in a range of combinations, and that is articulated primarily through the ANC and its associated formations.

This form of politics is shaped by the intersection of three large-scale social processes that begin or accelerate in the moment of decolonisation:

- The transition to democracy
- Rapid formation of a black elite
- The struggle to make a life



The intersection of these processes has in turn produced an **informal political-economic system, which** combines elite formation, patronage politics, intense factionalism within the ANC, and violence. This paper presents an analysis of the workings of political violence, grounded in a number of different communities in which a team of researchers has been conducting research over the past eight or nine years.

In this analysis, I attempt a reflection on the different kinds of work accomplished by violence, pursuing this along four lines of enquiry.

First, I explore the *political work of violence* in relation to democracy, elite-formation and citizenship. I do this in the first instance through an account of two protests, in 2009 and 2013, in the same community, each of which followed a very similar sequence and repertoire though with contrasting outcomes. These protests embodied the demands and repertoires of insurgent citizenship directed against the Town Council, but were driven at the same time by an intra-elite struggle for control over the ANC and the Council because of the opportunities and resources it provided for enrichment, patronage and upward mobility. Violence was directed both against the authorities and against factional rivals. Similar dynamics shaped the second protest as well, including now an element of revenge against the leaders of the first protest who had benefited but failed to implement their promises. Insights from the research in other towns and cities amplify and expand on these findings.

Secondly, I consider the process of subjectivation through the agency conferred by violence, and the obverse of this in the trauma and desire for revenge of those targeted by violence. This section describes the agency and sense of power experienced by young unemployed men (and women) at the margins of the social order when they take part in protest and particularly when they engage in violent confrontation with the police. Such subjects are not solely constituted by violent acts, but by the social meaning of these acts on behalf of the community. Conversely, the targets of violence may experience this as an assault on self, a kind of desubjectivation, which is experienced as trauma and disempowerment, and may feed cycles of revenge.

Thirdly, I investigate the nature of violence - its intractability and pervasiveness, its promiscuity, its mutability, its polyvocal or polysemous quality, its codes and regulations, its communicativeness, its productiveness and its relation to order and patriarchy. Here again I draw on the research from different communities in order to think about the multiple ways violence moves, changes, returns and switches sides, produces or disrupts order.

Finally, I surface the argument in communities over the use of violence and the persistent dream of peace, of a society without violence. Thus the burning of municipal offices and councilor homes may be seen as a form of communication, an assertion of accountability and justice - or, conversely, as acts of destruction, criminality or perversity that seriously inconvenience community members who rely on these facilities, and drive wedges between people that are difficult to resolve. Likewise, the resort to vigilantism or xenophobic violence by some in communities is contested by strong arguments for social integration and for defending the role and the law of the state. State formation is a process rooted not only in institution building by elites, but also through collective action from below. Here I identify the resilient dream of peaceful communities and a responsive, effective and just state as the guarantor of public order - and argue that it is as important to pay attention to this dream, its implications and its associated practices, as to violence.

BIOGRAPHIES



Desmond Arias

Professor Enrique Desmond Arias' is Marx Chair of Western Hemisphere Affairs and Professor at Baruch College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York. His research focuses on security and politics in Latin America and the Caribbean. He is the author of *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Cambridge University Press, 2017) *Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, and Public Security* (University of North Carolina Press, 2006) and is co-editor of *Violent Democracies in Latin America* published (Duke University Press, 2010). His writing has appeared in *Comparative Politics*, *Perspectives on Politics*, the *Latin American Research Review*, *Current Sociology*, the *Journal of Latin American Studies*, *Policing and Society*, *Qualitative Sociology*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, *America's Quarterly*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *Americas Quarterly*, *Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica* and the *Revista de Estudios Socio-Juridicos*. As part of his work with these last two organizations, Professor Arias was the principal author of the *United Nations Introductory Handbook on Policing Urban Space*.

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Among his latest publications are "*Política e polícia: controles, cuidados e penalizações de jovens*" (Lamparina, 2013), "*Brazil: violence and public insecurity*" (Lexington Books, 2018), and "*Anarquia y lucha antipolítica - ayer y hoy*" (NoLibros, 2019).



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Aninka Claassens has been a land activist for many years.

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Jacinto Cuvi is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Neuchatel in Switzerland.

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Publications include, *The Humanitarian Hangover: Displacement, Aid, and Transformation in Western Tanzania* (Wits Press); *Forging African Communities: Mobility, Integration, and Belonging* (Palgrave); *I Want to Go Home Forever: Stories of Becoming and Belonging in South Africa's Great Metropolis* (Wits Press); *Contemporary Migration to South Africa* (World Bank); and *Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa* (UN University Press/Wits Press).



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Alice Mushagalusa is a PhD fellow at SWOP, University of the Witwatersrand, and is interested in understanding the meaning people give to the violence (from above and below).

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Garth Stevens is a Professor and Clinical Psychologist in the Department of Psychology, in the School of Human and Community Development, at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa. His research interests include foci on race, racism and related social asymmetries; racism and knowledge production; critical psychology, ideology, power and discourse; violence and its prevention; historical/collective trauma and memory; applied psychoanalytic theorising of contemporary social issues; and masculinity, gender and violence.

He has published widely in these areas, both nationally and internationally, including co-editorships of *A 'race' against time: Psychology and challenges to deracialisation in South Africa* (UNISA Press, 2006) and *Race, memory and the apartheid archive: Towards a transformative psychosocial praxis* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). He is the co-lead researcher on the Violent States, States of Violence Project, which aims to re-engage a theorisation of violence in the contemporary world. At present, he holds a B-rating from the National Research Foundation, is a member of the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf), serves as the Acting Dean in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of the Witwatersrand, and is President-Elect of the Psychological Society of South Africa (PsySSA).

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Karl von Holdt

Karl von Holdt stepped down as Director of the Society Work and Politics Institute (SWOP) at the University of the Witwatersrand at the end of 2018, and is currently Professor and Senior Researcher in SWOP.

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Publications include *Transition from below: forging trade unionism and workplace change in South Africa*; (with Michael Burawoy) *Conversations with Bourdieu: the Johannesburg moment*; and (edited with Eddie Webster) *Beyond the apartheid workplace: studies in transition*.



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